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Good afternoon. My name is David J. Lennett, and I am a staff attorney
with the Environmental Defense Fund (EDF). I have been EDF's principal
attorney on hazardous waste regulatory matters for six years. In that
capacity, I have participated in many administrative and judicial proceedings
regarding the implementation of the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act
(RCRA). I have also served on the hazardous waste advisory committee for the
Office of Technology Assessment, and have testified before this Subcommittee
and other committees of the Congress regarding inadequacies in the federal
hazardous waste regulatory program. NY testmimony today will cover a
variety of important implementation issues facing the RCRA program, while my
colleagues will focus on EPA's recent land disposal ban proposal.
As an introductory note, the Subcommittee is to be commended for its
efforts in enacting the 1984 Amendments to RCRA. These amendments are already
having a strong and positive effect on hazardous waste management practices in
this country. In particular, the use of unlined surface imoundments has
substantially declined in the past year. These surface impoundments have
contributed to significant environmental contamination, and would have been
allowed to continue operating under EPA regulations in effect prior to the
passage of the 1984 Amendments.
Significantly, the two provisions of the 1904 Amendments most responsible
for the decline in reliance on surface impoundments are statutory directives
not heavily dependent on the promulgation of EPA regulations or the exercise
of EPA discretion. They are the impoundment retrofit requirements established
by Congress effective November 1988, and the loss of interim status provisions
effective November 1905. Together, these two provisions have encouraged the
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regulated community to reexamine their surface impoundments expeditiously, and
in most cases, to put them out of business. The success of these provisions,
when juxtaposed with the exercise of EPA discretion described below, argues
strongly for greater specificity in RCRA when Congress reauthorizes the law
again in the coming years.
CLOSURE
EPA figures indicate that approximately 1000 interim status land disposal
facilities were forced to cease operations as of November 8, 1985. The vast
majority of these facilities could not certify compliance with either the
applicable groundwater monitoring requirements or financial responsibility
requirements, or both. Aside from the obvious implication which can and
should be drawn from these numbers about the efficacy of state and EPA
enforcement efforts, a critical implementation question arises. Specifically,
are EPA and the states capable of properly closing all these facilities in a
timely and environmentally acceptable manner given existing regulations and
current resources and management priorities? Unfortunately, the answer to
this question is no, and the end result may be that a significant number of
RCRA sites will become Superfund sites and the public will have been poorly
served by the RCRA regulatory program.
The failures of EPA in the closure area can be divided into three
categories: regulatory loopholes, lack of guidance and training, and
insufficient resource commitments. With regard to regulatory loopholes, EPA
has failed to modify a surface impoundment closure regulation which allows the
owners/operators of certain impoundments to close without cleaning up most of
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the contamination caused by the facility. This particular regulation, 40 CFR
265.228(b), merely requires that owners/operators of impoundments receiving
characteristic wastes clean up contaminated soil and groundwater meeting the
regulatory definition of a hazardous waste. Because the current definition of
a hazardous waste is so inadequate, most contaminated soil and groundwater
would not be covered under this regulation. As a result, the contamination
may be left in place, and no post—closure care is required.
EPA proposed a modification to this regulation in July of 1982, but still
has not completed the rulemaking. Considering the nuiber of facilities
potentially involved, EPA's lackadaisical attitude toward fixing this
regulation is inexcusable. Moreover, new Section 3005(i) of RCRA, as added by
Section 243(c) of the 1984 Amendments, explicitly states that interim status
surface impoundments that received hazardous waste after July 26, 1982 must be
subject to the same groundwater monitoring and cleanup requirements as
permitted facilities. Yet EPA failed to fix 40 CFR 265.228(b) in the
rulemaking codifying the 1984 Amendments, even though permitted impoundments
are subject to such more stringent cleanup requirements at closure.
Compounding the difficulties caused by weak regulations is the almost
total lack of guidance available to EPA and state field personnel about how to
properly close an interim status land disposal facility. There Ere many
difficult issues which arise with respect to such closures, and EPA
Headquarters has managed to develop only three pages of guidance on this
subject. As an example of the kind of issues which arise in the closure
context, consider the case of a facility with an unlined inpoundment which was
never monitored in accordance with federal or state regulations. The facility
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owner/operator may claim that the facility has not contaminated the underlying
soil or groundwater, but considering the design of the facility and the liquid
nature of the waste in the impoundment, contamination can be reasonably
expected. If the impoundment bad been properly monitored for the last four
years, there would be some basis for determining whether contamination has
occurred. However, because the owner/operator has been allowed to violate the
law all this time, valid groundwater monitoring data is just not available.
Some of the issues which arise under this scenario are whether the
facility owner/operator should be required to properly monitor groundwater
prior to or as a condition of closure, how long such monitoring should
continue, whether soil sampling should be required in addition to or in lieu
of groundwater monitoring, and what constitutes appropriate response actions
should sampling reveal contamination of the soil or groundwater. In cases
where the impoundment has been operating for many years, substantial
contamination may have occurred, requiring difficult judgments about sampling
parameters and the location and number of samples to be taken. Unfortunately,
this leaking impoundment scenario is not unusual; most of the closing
facilities are impoundments, many of which are unlined. Furthermore, many are
closing specifically because they were not in compliance with groundwater
monitoring requirements. Therefore, the issues just described are not
intellectual abstractions but immediate concerns. If they are not properly
resolved, the owner/operator of an impoundment may be able to walk away from
contamination he is responsible for, and the RCRA program will have failed.
EPA's inability to develop appropriate closure guidance is a major reason the
substantial possibility of such a failure exists.
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The lack of written guidance is especially glaring given the complete
lack of training EPA has provided state and federal field personnel. EDF has
reviewed dozens of closure plans and has worked closely with these officials
as part of this process. Based on our experience, we have found it is not
unusual for the least experienced personnel to be assigned responibility for
closure plans. These people have a difficult enough time mastering the RCRA
program in general, let alone making policy recommendations on complex closure
issues without any guidance to assist them. Although the RCRA program is
delegated and decentralized, EPA cannot and should not shirk its
responsibilities for ensuring field personnel are properly prepared for the
tasks they assume.
Finally, the closure process should be completed in accordance with
timetables specified in EPA regulations. These regulations require that
owners/operators of facilities ceasing operations as of November 8, 1985 must
submit closure plans for approval by November 23, 1985. Within 90 days of the
submissions, the Regional Administrator or the authorized state is required to
approve, modify or disapprove the plans. If the plans are disapproved, the
owners/operators must submit a new plan within 30 days, and the revised plans
must be approved or modified by the Regional Administrator or authorized state
within 60 days of the second submission. Accordingly, the closure plan
approval process for the 1000 facilities should be completed by May 23, 1986.
EDF estimates that if twenty percent of the 1000 closing facilities are
managed in accordance with EPA regulations, it will be a miracle. These
deadlines were routinely ignored by EPA prior to November 8, and the number of
facilities closing as of November 8 argue strongly against anticipating
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improvement by EPA in this critical area. The reasons for this poor
performance are many, but chief among them are the low priority and
insufficient resources devoted by EPA to the closure process. EDP urges this
Subcommittee to question EPA as to when the closure of the 1000 facilities
will be completed given existing resources assigned to closures at the state
and federal level. In making this request, it is not EDF's intent to
encourage the rapid approval of poorly developed plans, but rather to elevate
the closure process as an Agency priority.
SMALL QUANTITY GENERATOR REGULATIONS
EPA will shortly issue final regulations that lower the small quantity
generator exemption to 100 kilograms per month, as required by the 1984 RCRA
Amendments. However, the regulations EPA intends to issue include a glaring
loophole which will return the program to the days of unregulated midnight
dumping. The loophole involves the waste tracking system EPA intends to
employ for small quantity generators.
Under the EPA scheme, small quantity generators will be required to fill
out manifest forms which accompany the waste to the designated facility
licensed to manage the waste. The generator retains a copy of the manifest,
and upon delivery of the waste to the designated facility, the owner/operator
of the facility mails a second copy of the manifest (which he signs to
confirm delivery) to the generator. When the generator receives the second
manifest in the mail, he knows the waste arrived where it belongs. But what
if the second manifest never comes in the mail? This could mean the manifest
was lost in the mail, or it could mean the waste was dumped on the side of the
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road somewhere. EPA apparently doesn't care what the reason is, because it
does not intend to require small quantity generators to notify EPA or an
authorized state if the second manifest does not come in the mail. Large
quantity generators are required to notify; they must file exception reports
within 45 days of the waste shipments if delivery to the facility is not
confirmed. These exceptions reports are the only routine method available to
regulatory authorities to ascertain whether midnight dumping is occurring
under the federal rules. Nevertheless, EPA has determined that filing
exception reports is too large a burden to place on these newly regulated
generators. How large a burden can this possibly be? It is a requirement
that becomes effective only when delivery has not been confirmed, and the
exception report itself is not a lengthy document.
Theoretically, EPA sight not need exception reports if it intended to
inspect small quantity generators frequently enough to determine if generators
are receiving second manifest copies from facility owner/operators. The
reality is, however, that EPA's regulations allow the generator to destroy
manifests after three years, and EPA and the states don't currently inspect
large quantity generators every three years. In light of these inspection
deficiencies one would expect EPA to retain the exception reporting
requirement as minimal protection against midnight dumping. Unfortunately,
EPA has once again lost sight of its mission to protect human health and the
environment.
OMB INTERFERENCE IN HCRA RULEMAKING
-7-
EPA has yielded to illegal OMB efforts to delay the issuance of rules
subject to statutory deadlines. ED)' recently challenged a glaring example of
such activity, where OMB refused to allow EPA to propose the Congressionally
mandated permitting standards for underground tanks storing hazardous waste.
Despite a statutory deadline of March 1, 1985, OMB required EPA to submit
its notice of proposed rulemaking to OMB for review under Executive Order
12291. EPA submitted the notice of proposed rulemaking to OMB for review on
March 1, 1985, the date of the statutory deadline. Even though OMB staff
were acutely aware that the statutory deadline had expired, they waited for
six weeks before giving EPA staff any formal comments on the proposed
regulations. Because OMB staff disagreed with several aspects of EPA's
proposal, they refused to approve it for publication in the Federal Register.
OMB notified EPA that it was invoking the extended review provisions of the
executive order in order to prohibit EPA from publishing its proposal. Thus,
even though the statutory deadline had expired, OMB invoked the executive
order to prohibit EPA from taking action required by Congress.
OMB staff refused to clear the proposed regulations in their original
form and insisted that EPA make significant changes in them. EPA staff
submitted revised regulations to OMB for review on May 10, 1985. OMB still
was not satisfied with the revised regulations and they insisted on further
changes. Only after ED)' and two of its members filed a lawsuit against both
EPA and OMB on May 30, 1985 did OMB permit EPA to publish the proposed
standards. But OMB first dictated still further changes in the proposed
standards before they were published on June 26, 1985.
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OMB and EPA completely ignored the procedures established by Executive
Order 12291 to prevent OMB review from conflicting with statutory deadlines.
Section 8(a)(2) of the executive order provides that such conflicts are to be
reported to OMB and a statement is to be published in the Federal Register
explaining why the normal review procedures cannot be followed. OMB's own
Form 83, "Request for OMB Review," and the agency's Regulatory Docket
Worksheets contain a box marked "Statutory or Judicial Deadline," which is
checked when a rule is not submitted to OMB for review prior to publication
because of a deadline. OMB ignores this procedure entirely, as indicated by
the fact that OMB's Regulatory Docket Worksheets treated the tank standards as
a "Standard" submission even though EPA had checked the "Statutory or Judicial
Deadline" box on Form 83.
In response to EDF's discovery requests, OMB and EPA admitted that they
have no formal procedures outlining the circumstances under which OMB review
is to be bypassed pursuant to section 8(a)(2) of Executive Order 12291 in
order to comply with statutory deadlines. Roth OMB and EPA Were unable to
cite a single instance in which the procedures of section 8(a)(2) were
followed. In fact, EDF discovered that OMB apparently has no way of
identifying regulations subject to statutory deadlines in their computer
tracking system. OMB's annual reports reveal that there have been only five
instances — and none since 1983 — in which OMB has even acknowledged that its
review of EPA regulations has been affected by a statutory or judicial
deadline.
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OMB's review of the proposed permitting standards for underground tanks
storing hazardous waste illustrates how OMB has abused its review power in an
effort to substitute its judgment for EPA's. Prior to submitting the proposed
standards to OMB for review, EPA determined that the best regulatory strategy
for protecting the environment against leaks in underground storage tanks was
to require secondary containment for such tanks. This approach would permit
leaks to be discovered before the toxic chemicals are released into the
environment. EPA considered varying control requirements for tanks based on
site-specific circumstances but it decided that this would be too expensive to
implement and would not provide adequate protection for human health and the
environment. OMB, however, objected to the "containment philosophy" behind
EPA's proposal. OMB does not believe that it is always desirable to prevent
leaks of toxic substances from underground tanks. OMB believes that only
leaks of hazardous waste that can be demonstrated by risk analysis to harm
human health should be contained. Thus OMB insisted that "any place in the
preamble (of the proposed tank regulations) where it was stated that the
intent of these regulations is to prevent releases to the environment" be
"changed to 'to protect human health and the environment'." OMB also insisted
that EPA base its standards on risk assessments, and that it consider varying
the standards to permit weaker regulations to apply on the basis of
site-specific factors. Thus OMB dictated to EPA how to interpret its
statutory mandate under RCRA, rejecting EPA'. approach.
The government argued in the tanks litigation that OPE does not displace
agency decisionmaking because EPA is free to reject OMB's changes. However,
unless EPA agrees to accept OMB's changes, OMB can block any regulatory action
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by EPA indefinitely. This is the strategy OMB uses to dictate the substance
of agency decisions. OMB review is extended indefinitely until the agency
agrees to the changes sought by OMB. If the agency resists, the regulations
can languish under extended review for months and even years.
It is clear that this is precisely what occurred with the tank standards.
OMB extended its review of the tank standards not simply to give it more time
to prepare its "advice," but also to ensure that its "advice" was adopted by
EPA. OMB refused to complete its review of the standards until it was
satisfied that all the changes sought by OMB had been made in EPA's proposal.
After EPA submitted a revised proposal on May 10, 1985, OMB insisted on still
further changes. On June 4, 1985, OMB staff net with EPA staff to dictate the
"fixes needed for clearance." Exhibit SA-13, in EDT v. Thomas, No.
85-1747. OMB staff insisted on approving word-for-word changes in the
proposed regulations. A handwritten note informed the Director of EPA's
Office of Solid Waste on June 6, 1985, that "OMB has concurred on the revised
tank package provided you agree to the following attached changes." Exhibit
SA-15, in EDT v. Thomas, No. 85-1747.
As you know, on January 23, 1986, the Court ruled in EDT's favor,
declaring that OMB has no authority to delay promulgation of RCRA rules beyond
statutory deadlines (copy of opinion attached). However, the government has
moved the Court to reconsider this aspect of the opinion. Significantly, EPA
has already missed RCRA deadlines for promulgating improved hazardous waste
export controls (due November 8, 1985), listing additional wastes (due
February 8, 1986), regulations minimizing the disposal of containerized
liquids in landfills (due February 8, 1986), and guidelines for federal
procurement of recycled paper products (due May 8, 1985). Prior to the Court
ruling, EPA indicated these rules would follow the same OMB review procedures
as the tank standards. EDF urges this Subcommittee to explore with EPA
whether these rules (in proposed and final form) will be submitted to OMB for
Executive Order 12291 review. Ironically, the government has argued in the
tanks case that EPA is free to ignore the OMB review process if it chooses to
do so. Therefore even in the absence of the court opinion, EPA is capable of
discharging its responsibilities in accordance with Congressional intent,
should it choose to do so.
DELISTING
EPA is processing delisting petitions submitted by the regulated
community, which if granted, would remove the waste streams covered by the
petitions from the jurisdiction of the federal hazardous waste regulatory
program. Once delisted, these wastes may be managed as any solid waste, like
municipal garbage. Therefore, it is imperative that these delisting petitions
be carefully evaluated and uncertainties be resolved against the granting of
the petitions.
Nevertheless, EPA has proposed a series of delistings recently where the
petitioner submitted either DO groundwater monitoring data for the units to be
delisted, or the data was invalid because the monitoring system or sampling
procedures at the facility were inadequate. The lack of monitoring data was a
result of four years of noncompliance with federal and state groundwater
monitoring regulations. By considering these delisting petitions, EPA is
rewarding the very persons who have been operating in violation of the law.
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Ironically, EPA has stated it will consider evidence of groundwater
contamination as grounds for denying a delisting petition. VA recognizes
that actual monitoring data acts as a verification of the theoretical modeling
on which the petitions would otherwise be based. Companies which have been
monitoring as the law requires may thus have their petitions denied if
monitoring data indicates contamination caused by the units to be delisted. On
the other hand, companies which have violated the low do not have this
problem. There is no evidence of contamination at their facilities because
they never looked for it, despite federal regulations to the contrary. In
short, EPA's delisting policy prefers ignorance over data, and violators over
compliers.
To complete this cycle of irrational policymaking, in several instances
EPA and state enforcement personnel chose not to require delisting petitioners
to install groundwater monitoring systems even though they were required to by
federal and state regulations. The reason was that these companies had filed
a delisting petition, even though it hadn't been processed or approved yet.
Therefore, simply by filing a petition, these companies were able to violate
the law, and now EPA Headquarters intends to reward them for their efforts.
GROUNDWATER MONITORING REQUIREMENTS
In recent months, EPA has failed to take action to modify its groundwater
monitoring regulations despite a Congressional mandate to do so, and has
issued guidance to federal and state permit writers which is contrary to the
intent of Congress. Both these actions resulted in a weakening of the
— 13 —
groundwater monitoring requirements.
Existing federal regulations require that the owner/operator of a
permitted facility locate the background monitoring well so that it is not
affected by leakage from a "regulated unit", defined as a hazardous waste land
disposal unit receiving waste after July 26, 1982. Conversely, the background
well may be contaminated by leakage from a non-regulated unit, which includes
any hazardous waste unit which stopped receiving waste prior to July 26, 1982,
and any solid waste unit. Should the background well become contaminated with
leakage from a non-regulated unit, it can camouflage leakage from the unit the
regulations are intended to monitor. This happens because the presence of
contamination at the monitored unit is determined by comparing contaminant
levels in the background well with levels in downgradient wells. If the
contaminant levels in the background well are already high, levels of
contamination in the downgradient wells will not appear significantly elevated
above background, and will not trigger an appropriate response action.
Section 3004(u) of RCRA now requires persons with RCRA permits to address
releases into groundwater from any solid or hazardous unit at the facility as
a condition of receiving the permit. These releases include the kind of
leakage that could contaminate background monitoring wells for regulated
units. As Congress recognized when it enacted Section 3004(u), this new
cleanup requirement would require a change in EPA's groundwater monitoring
requirements. As the Senate Report states:
To assure corrective action is taken in response to releases
of hazardous wastes or constituents from an inactive unit at a
facility seeking or having received a RCRA permit, the
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Administrator will need to revise groundwater monitoring
requirements to detect possible releases from all inactive units
from which a release could occur at a facility. It will be
necessary to determine background water quality at a point
unaffected by any waste management activities at the facility.
Despite the enactment of Section 3004(u) over fifteen months ago, EPA has
not made the necessary modification to its regulations. On November 7, 1985,
EDF petitioned EPA to make this modification, but we have still not received a
reply from the Agency.
In contrast, the Agency has taken swift action to weaken its groundwater
monitoring requirements. Permit applicants are required to monitor
groundwater for a list of approximately 375 contaminants (called the Appendix
VIII list of hazardous constituents) if interim status groundwater monitoring
has indicated the facility has contaminated groundwater at the time the
application is filed. If contamination is not detected until after the permit
is issued, Appendix VIII monitoring is required when contamination is
detected. During a subsequent monitoring stage, known as compliance
monitoring, Appendix VIII scans are required at least on an annual basis.
Without formally changing these regulations, the Agency has issued two
documents intended to sharply reduce the number of substances that must be
monitored at these points in time. The justification for this action given by
EPA is that many of the Appendix VIII constituents are either too difficult or
impossible to analyze. The list of substances covered by the guidance
eliminates over one fourth of the Appendix VIII list, yet the list was not
subject to any outside peer review (including the Science Advisory Board), or
public notice and comment before the guidance was issued. Now that the
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guidance is already in use, EPA is soliciting public comment.
There are many troubling aspects to the Appendix VIII action. Several
are procedural in nature. The Agency has, in effect, drastically modified
important hazardous waste regulations without providing for any public input.
While the guidance was being prepared, EDF was denied copies of the list of
chemicals to be covered by the guidance upon repeated requests. Moreover, a
little over a year ago, EPA had begun a rulemaking intended to address some of
the problems with Appendix VIII. Instead of completing this rulemaking, or
proposing another rule for comment, EPA chose an approach which prevented
public involvement until the relevant documents were already in use by the
Agency. How can this approach can be squared with Agency pronouncements about
the need for effective public participation in the RCRA program and EPA's
so-called "open door policy"?
Another troubling aspect of EPA's guidance concerns the substances
themselves that were covered by the guidance, and the reasons EPA used for not
requiring their analysis. As Dr. Silbergeld can detail, if you wish, the
guidance is technically flawed, which is not surprising considering the
technical basis for it was essentially prepared in three days. The
consequence of these flaws is that less comprehensive groundwater monitoring
data will be available in the coming years than there otherwise should be.
Finally, and perhaps most significantly, to justify a weakening of the
permitting standards, EPA relies to a large degree on new Section 3005(c)(3)
of RCRA, or the omnibus provision of the 1984 Amendments. Ironically, this
provision was intended to authorize EPA to issue permits with more stringent
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terms and conditions than required by EPA regulations. But as the attached
memorandum reveals, EPA has turned the provision on its head by relying upon
it for the opposite result, in blatant disregard of Congressional intent. The
precedent of using Section 3005(c)(3) in this manner, and the potential for
abuse of this authority by federal and state permit writers, is deserving of
special attention from this Subcommittee. In light of this omnibus
interpretation and the land disposal ban proposal, one must question whether
EPA views its mission as implementing the laws as enacted by Congress, or
implementing policies it believes are appropriate irrespective of the laws
enacted by the Congress.
Thank you for the opportunity to testify today. I would be happy to
answer any questions you may have.
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v.	 ) Civil Action No.
) 85-1747
LEE M. THOMAS, Administrator,	 )
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, 	 )
et al.,	 )	 FILED
)
Defendants.	 )	 JAN 21 1983	 )
CLERK, US. DSTR:CT COURT,
DiSTRICT r "OLUMCIA
MEMORANDUM
This matter comes before the court on the parties'
cross-motions for summary judgment. Plaintiffs' motion has
appended to it various public documents as well as documents
under seal regarding deliberations between defendants.
Defendants' motion, originally filed in July of 1985, was
supplemented in December of 1985. This court has allowed groups
representing the electric utilities industry to file a single
amici curiae brief.
I. Background
In November of 1984, Congress enacted the Hazardous and
Solid Waste Amendments of 1984 (1984 Amendments'), Pub. L. 98-
616 (Nov. 8, 1984), which amended the Resource Conservation and
Recovery Act ("RCRAm ), 42 U.S.C. 9 6924. RCRA is a comprehensive
statute designed to regulate the management of hazardous and
3.
solid wastes. One of the new amendments, Section 3004(w) of
RCRA, 42 U.S.C. S 6924(w), provides that "(n)ot later than March
1, 1985, the (Environmental Protection Agency or "EPA")
Administrator shall promulgate final permitting standards under
this gection for underground tanks that cannot be entered for
inspection."
This deadline was not met. Plaintiffs contend that
EPA's ability to promulgate the regulations was further prevented
by the unlawful interference of the Office of Management and
Budget ("OMB"). Plaintiffs, Environmental Defense Fund Inc.
("EDF") and two individuals brought suit in this court on May 30,
1985. Plaintiffs seek an order that EPA must promulgate the
regulations by April 25, 1986. Plaintiffs also seek injunctive
relief against OMB to prevent similar interference in the future.
Defendants EPA and OMB want until June 30, 1986 to
promulgate the regulations. Further, they contend that this
court has no jurisdiction to grant injunctive relief against OMB
of this kind. The electric utilities groups, Edison Electric et
al., agree with defendants.
II. Jurisdiction
Both parties agree that RCRA gives this court jurisdiction
to order the Administrator of EPA to perform nondiscretionary
duties and allows this court to set a date by which EPA must
promulgate the hazardous waste tank regulations. 42 U.S.C.
6972(a)(2). The only real dispute is by which deadline EPA can
2
reasonably be ordered to promulgate final standards.
Jurisdiction to grant injunctive relief against OMB is the
more controversial aspect of this suit. At the crux of this
disagreement is the lawfulness of OMB's activity pursuant to the
Congressional deadline and pursuant to Executive Order 12291, 46
Fed. Reg. 13193 (Feb. 17, -1981), 3 C.F.R. 127 (1982) ("EO
12291").
EO 12291 directs executive agencies to submit all proposed
and final rules to OMB for pre-publication review to determine if
they are consistent with certain criteria (e.g., the regulations
must be based on adequate information, the potential benefits
must outweigh the potential costs, the net benefits to society
must be maximized, and the alternative involving the least net
cost to society must he chosen). Also, the order states that
"major rules" are submitted to OMB for review 60 days before
publication of proposed rules and 30 days prior to publication of
final rules. All other rules are submitted to OMB for review 10
days before publication of proposed rules and 10 days prior to
publication of final rules. OMB is deemed to have concluded its
review after expiration of these time periods unless it notifies
the agency that it has extended its review pursuant to Section
3(f). This extension may be indefinite.
OMB's authority is qualified by the rule. Section 8(a)(2)
of E0 12291 exempts regulations "for which consideration or
e., reconsideration under the terms of this Order would conflict with
deadlines imposed by statute or by judicial order." Further,
3
"(n)othing in this subsection shall be construed as displacing
the agencies' responsibilities delegated by law." Sec. 3(f)(3).
The executive order also limits OMB's authority by authorizing
OMB to exercise its review only "to the extent permitted by law."
Secs.-2, 3(a), & 6(a).
Plaintiffs contend that OMB's interference with the
promulgation of the EPA regulations unlawfully delayed their
promulgation, in violation of both the RCRA amendments and the
Administrative Procedure Act ("APA"), 5 U.S.C. 706. Plaintiffs
argue that under 28 U.S.C. S 1331 and S 1361, this court may
exercise inherent equitable powers to grant injunctive relief
preventing further OMB interference.
Defendants respond that ordering OMB to refrain from
reviewing any proposed regulations under RCRA whenever such
review would delay promulgation of the regulation beyond a
statutory deadline is an unjustifiable and inappropriate use of
this court's power. As defendants see it, neither the RCRA nor
the APA gives this court jurisdiction over OMB in this matter.
Further, there is no jurisdiction to enforce any constraints
found within the Executive Order itself.
There is no doubt that this court has jurisdiction over both
plaintiffs' RCRA and APA claims against the Administrator of EPA.
42 U.S.C. 6972(a)(2) and 5 U.S.C. 702. In compelling EPA to
perform non-discretionary duties, however, it is also appropriate
to fashion equitable relief to ensure that such duties are
performed without the interference of other officials acting
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outside the scope of their authority in contravention of federal
law. Though injunctive relief is not appropriate in these
circumstances, as discussed below, there can be no doubt that an
executive agency or agencies can be enjoined by this court from
failing to execute laws enacted by Congress.
III. Discussion
While the merits of relief against EPA and relief against
OMB can be discussed separately, first a discussion of what
exactly caused the delay in promulgating the regulations is in
order. From the documents released by OMB and EPA under seal, an
interesting picture of OMB involvement in the promulgation
r process emerges.
Congress set March 1, 1985, as the deadline for promulgating
the regulations. OMB commenced its review of the proposed
permitting standards on March 4, 1985. Since these were not
"major rules" under the meaning of EO 12291, EPA anticipated that
OMB would complete its review within 10 days. On March 15, 1985,
EPA staff briefed OMB staff on the proposed regulations. OMB
refused to clear the regulations and on March 25, 1985, notified
EPA that its was extending its review of the proposed
regulations. OMB apparently wanted EPA to gather additional
information prior to promulgating the regulations even though it
would delay the process. By April 10, 1985, EPA had still not
received any formal comments from OMB.
e--	
By April 12, 1985, it was clear that OMB had serious
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differences with EPA over what regulations to propose. At a
meeting of April 16, 1985 between OMB and EPA staff members, OMB
sought significant changes in the proposed regulations in four
areas. The idea, apparently, was to shift the goal of the
regulations away from EPA's philosophy of containing all leaks of
waste disposals to OMB's philosophy of preventing only leaks of
waste that can be demonstrated by risk analysis to threaten harm
to human health.
Internal disagreement within OMB further delayed OMB's
consideration of the regulations. Some OMB staff members
apparently felt that OMB should not be dictating substantive
policy decisions to EPA while others felt the precedent being set
an important one for OMB review of other RCRA regulations.
After this suit was filed on May 30, 1985, OMB continued to
seek specific changes in EPA's proposed regulations as well as
changes not previously discussed. After various negotiations
regarding the substance of the regulations, OMB completed its
review and cleared the proposed regulations on June 12, 1985.
The EPA Adminstrator signed them June 14, 1985 and the proposed
regulations were published in the Federal Register on June 26,
1985, 50 Fed. Reg. 26444, after OMB approved some last-minute
stylistic changes made by EPA staff.
A. The Final Date for Promulgating the Regulations 
The parties agree and this court finds that the
Administrator of EPA has failed to comply with his non-
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discretionary duties under S 3004(w) of the RCRA. There is
disagreement, however, about when the final regulations should be
ordered promulgated. Plaintiffs contend that a reasonable time
is April 25, 1986 while defendants prefer a deadline of one year
from the date the regulations were proposed (i.e. June 30, 1986).
Defendants justify their time-table in an affidavit filed
by John H. Skinner, Director of EPA's Office of Solid Waste
("OSW"). Public comments were received on the proposed
regulations during a two-month period in the summer of 1985.
EPA's technical staff evaluated these comments from September
through November 1985. After completing a risk assessment, EPA
will develop final draft rules by the end of February 1986. By
mid-April, 1986, an EPA work group will comment on the final
draft and OSW will complete a revised draft in light of these
comments. By the end of May, 1986, OSW will prepare the final
rulemaking package for senior level review within EPA (known as
"Red Border" review) and for OMB review. The time for doing this
will be streamlined and the two agencies review will be done
concurrently. The regulations will then become final by June 30,
1986.
Plaintiffs argue that one year is unnecessarily long. EPA
has not received as many public comments as was anticipated.
EPA's prior and current promulgation schedules are in the
neighborhood of nine months, not one year (e.g., the schedule now
being followed for comparable small generator rules). As
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plaintiffs see it, this is the kind of unwarranted delay which
this and other courts have struck down before. NRDC V. 
Ruckelshaus, 14 ELR 20817 (D.D.C. Sept. 14, 1984); State of New
York v. Gorsuch, 554 F. Supp. 1060 (S.D.N.Y. 1983); Environmental
Defense Fund v. Gorsuch, 17 ERC 1099 (D.D.C. 1982); Sierra Club
v. Gorsuch, 551 F. Supp. 185 (N.D. Cal. 1982); State of Illinois 
v. Gorsuch, 530 F. Supp. 340 (D.D.C. 1981).
Promulgation of regulations 16 months after a Congressional
deadline is highly irresponsible. Congress was aware of the
complexity of these hazardous waste regulations and yet decided
that quick promulgation was of paramount importance. Now that
the damage is done, however, this court must fashion an equitable
remedy that best achieves the Congressional purpose. This court
has previously felt bound to accept a proposed schedule by EPA
where EPA demonstrates through affidavit that it is "proceeding
in good faith," Illinois v. Gorsuch, 12 ERC 1597, 1598 (D.D.C.
1979), rather than mandate flat guidelines of its own. NRDC V. 
Train, 510 F.2d 697, 712-13 (D.C. Cir. 1975). After reviewing
the proposed schedule set forth by EPA in this case, it appears
that the June 30, 1986 deadline is reasonable. This date is only
two months later than the date sought by plaintiffs. Therefore,
it is ordered that the regulations be promulgated by that time.




J. OMB's Interference with the Promulgation Process
From the discussion above, it seems clear that OMB did
contribute to the delay in the promulgation of the regulations by
insisting on certain substantive changes. The released documents
show that EPA was ready to announce proposed regulations in the
Federal Register as early as March 31, 1985, but due to OMB it
did not happen until three months later.
A certain degree of deference must be given to the authority
of the President to control and supervise executive policymaking.
Sierra Club v. Costle, 657 F.2d 298, 405 (D.C. Cir. 1982)
(regarding whether oral communications between EPA and the White
House must be docketed on the rule-making record when EPA revises
,„Clean Air Act provisions). Yet, the use of EO 12291 to create
delays and to impose substantive changes raises some
constitutional concerns. Congress enacts environmental
legislation after years of study and deliberation, and then
delegates to the expert judgment of the EPA Administrator the
authority to issue regulations carrying out the aims of the law.
Under EO 12291, if used improperly, OMB could withhold approval
until the acceptance of certain content in the promulgation of
any new EPA regulation, thereby encroaching upon the independence
and expertise of EPA. Further, unsuccessful executive lobbying
on Capitol Hill can still be pursued administratively by delaying
the enactment of regulations beyond the date of a statutory
deadline. This is incompatible with the will of Congress and
cannot be sustained as a valid exercise of the President's
9
Article II powers.
Such concerns were noted by Congress when EO 12291 was
passed. In order to ensure the legality of the operation of EO
12291, James C. Miller III, now the director but then the
administrator of OMB's Office of Information and Regulatory
Affairs ("OIRA"), appeared before a congressional committee and
stressed the importance of construing narrowly the authority
granted to OMB. Mr. Miller testified:
President Reagan's Executive order imposes on the agencies
only "to the extent permitted by law" and only to the extent
that its terms would not "conflict with deadlines imposed by
statute or by judicial order." The limited application of
(E0 12291) is a crucial point, one that insures (its)
legality and the legality of actions pursuant to (it). ...
If a statute or a court order establishes a date for a
rulemaking action, the Executive Order 12291 cannot delay
that action.
Testimony of James C.' Miller III, in Role of OMB in Regulation: 
Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Oversight and Investigation of
House Comm. on Energy & Commerce, 97th Cong., 1st Sess 46 (1981).
The Justice Department has also emphasized that EO 12291
must be construed narrowly to survive legal challenge.
(I)t is clear that the President's exercise of supervisory
powers must conform to legislation enacted by Congress. In
issuing directives to govern the Executive Branch, the
President may not, as a general proposition, require or
permit agencies to transgress boundaries set by Congress.
U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Legal Counsel Opinion on EO
12291, February 13, 1981.
This court has previously found that in certain egregious
situations, statutory delay caused by OMB review is in
contravention to applicable law under Section 0(a)(2) of EO 12291
10
and therefore that no further OMB review could occur. NRDC v. 
Ruckelshaus, 14 ELR 20817, 20818 (D.D.C. 1984). In Ruckelshaus,
however, by the time the court order issued, EPA was six years
passed the deadline set by Congress. In the case at bar,
enjoining OMB from interacting at all with EPA simply because OMB
might cause delay past the new judicial deadline is premature and
an unwarranted intrusion into discretionary executive
consultations.
There is, however, some credence in plaintiffs' fear that
the regulations due June 30, 1986, may still be delayed by OMB.
While defendants claim that OMB review of the final regulations
in May of 1986 will be concurrent with EPA senior level review,
such concurrent review of the proposed regulations in the spring
of 1985 resulted in cOnsiderable delay. Concurrent review does
not eliminate delay, since any changes sought by OMB must then be
reviewed by senior level EPA officials. This court declares
therefore that further review by OMB which creates any delay in
meeting the June 30, 1986 deadline is unreasonable and
unacceptable. EPA is obligated to promulgate the regulations by
that date and may not use the excuse of OMB review to refrain
from doing so.
Plaintiffs also protest that OMB routinely reviews other EPA
regulations subject to statutory deadlines even if such review
will delay promulgation beyond the deadline. Unless this court
declares that OMB has no authority to delay promulgation of all
EPA regulations beyond statutory deadlines, OMB will continue to
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do so both for the Section 3004(w) standards and for other RCRA
regulations subject to statutory deadlines in the 1984
amendments. Through answers to interrogatories, plaintiffs show
that EPA submitted 169 regulations to OMB which were subject to
statutory or judicial deadlines, and on 86 occasions OMB extended
its review beyond the time periods outlined in EO 12291. OMB's
propensity to extend review has become so great that EPA keeps a
running record of the number of its rulemaking actions under
extended review by OMB and the resulting delays. The average
delay per regulation is 91 days; total delays were more than 311
weeks. Apparently Section 8(a)(2) of EO 12291 is simply ignored.
Congress clearly is concerned with OMB's use of EO 12291
with regard to the deadlines set within the 1984 Amendments. The
House Committee report that accompanied the 1984 Amendments
states:
The Committee is extremely concerned that EPA has not been
able to comply with past statutory mandates and timetables,
not just for RCRA, but for virtually all its programs... .
The Administrator's ability to meet this deadline (for
publishing a schedule for land disposal ban decisions) as
with all other deadlines in this bill, shall not be impaired
in any way whatsoever by Executive Order 12291.
Hazardous Waste Control and Enforcement Act of 1983, Report of
House Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 98th Cong., 1st Sess., May
17, 1983, at 34, 35, 1984 U.S. Code Cong. 6 Admin. News 5576,
5593-94.
The Hazardous and Solid Waste Amendments of 1984 added at
least 44 new deadlines to RCRA, 29 of which must be satisfied
within the next 20 months.
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
This court declares that OMB has no authority to use its
regulatory review under EC) 12291 to delay promulgation of EPA
regulations arising from the 1984 Amendments of the RCRA beyond
the date of a statutory deadline. Thus, if a deadline already
has euired, OMB has no authority to delay regulations subject to
the deadline in order to review them under the executive order.
If the deadline is about to expire, OMB may review the
regulations only until the time at which OMB review will result
in the deadline being missed. From its tracking system, EPA can
determine when further delay due to OMB review will result in a
deadline being missed.
While this may be an intrusion into the degree of
flexibility the executive agencies have in taking their time
about promulgating these regulations, this is simply a judicial
recognition of law as passed by Congress and of the method for
dealing with deadlines laid down by the President himself. Such
a recognition is not new. See NRDC v. Gorsuch, 17 ERC 2013, 2016
(D.D.C. 1982). Indeed, OMB itself admits that it cannot prevent
an agency from complying with statutory requirements. Yet
declaratory relief is necessary to ensure compliance with the
clearly expressed will of Congress. This is not an inappropriate
interference with the interaction of executive agencies; all such
interaction may continue absent a "conflict with deadlines
imposed by statute or by judicial order." Sec. 8, E0 12291.
An appropriate Order accompanies this Memorandum.
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CLERK, US,	 RIZT COURT,
ORDER AND DECLARATION
	 DISTRICT ^- "OLUMSIA
This matter comes before the court on the parties'
cross-motions for summary judgment. After consideration of the
motions, the oppositions thereto, the amici curiae brief, and the
entire record herein, it is, by the court, this 9.0 day of
January, 1986,
ORDERED that defendants' motion for leave to file a
response to plaintiffs' December 23, 1985 submission is granted;
and it is further
ORDERED that plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment is
granted in part and denied in part, and defendants' motion for
summary judgment (as supplemented) is granted in part and denied
in part; and it is further
DETERMINED AND DECLARED that defendant Environmental
Protection Agency has failed to perform its mandatory duty under
Section 3004(w) of the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act
ea- ( "RCRA"), 42 U.S.C. 6924(w); and it is further
ORDERED that no later than June 30, 1986, defendant
1
Environmental Protection Agency shall promulgate final permitting
standards for underground tanks pursuant to Section 3004(w) of
RCRA; and it is further
DETERMINED AND DECLARED that defendant Office of
Management and Budget has no authority to delay the promulgation
of final permitting standards for underground tanks pursuant to
Section 3004(w) of RCRA by withholding approval of the standards
past June 30, 1986; and it is further
DETERMINED AND DECLARED that defendant Office of Management
and Budget has no authority to delay the promulgation of EPA
regulations arising from the Hazardous and Solid Waste Amendments
of 1984 of the RCRA, Pub. L. 98-616 (Nov. 8, 1984), by
withholding approval past statutory or judicial deadlines.
Lzt 
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Office of Solid Waste (WH-562)
EPA's regulations under the Resource Conservation and
Recovery Act (RCRA) require owners and operators of some
land-based hazardous waste facilities to analyze ground
water for each of the 375 hazardous constituents listed in
Appendix VIII to 40 C.F.R. Part 261. For a number of reasons
this analysis has proven to be very difficult. The Agency
is preparing guidance recommending that permit writers use
the waiver provision in 40 C.F.R. 5270.14(a) to reduce the
number of constituents for analysis in permit applications.
You have asked whether there are any arguments for similar
flexibility under the Part 264 regulations that govern faci-
lities after they obtain permits.
QUESTION
Do the regulations in Subpart F of 40 C.F.R. Part 264
require analysis of each hazardous constituent in Appendix
VIII at all land-based facilities?
ANSWER
No, the Part 264 regulations do not require Appendix VIII
analyses for all land-based facilities. There is a strong
-2-
argument that the corrective action monitoring program under
S264.100 does not require a full Appendix VIII analysis.
Moreover, although the detection and compliance monitoring
programs require full Appendix VIII analyses, there is a
strong argument that EPA may waive testing requirements for
those constituents for which analysis is impossible. We can
also make arguments for waiving additional constituents for
which analysis is difficult and time-consuming. Waivers




The Part 264 regulations for land disposal facilities
that EPA promulgated in 1982 establish a progressive
sequence of ground-water monitoring requirements. At specified
points in the sequence, facility owners and operators must
analyze ground water for all constituents in Appendix VIII.
An owner or operator that has not found ground-water contamina-
tion prior to permit issuance must begin by sampling for in-
dicator parameters under a detection monitoring program. If
the owner or operator observes an increase in indicator
parameters, he must immediately analyze for all Appen-
dix VIII constituents present in ground water. 40 C.F.R.
S264.98(h)(2). The Regional Administrator must set ground-
water protection standards based on the constituents found
in this analysis. 40 C.F.R. S264.92, 264.93, 264.99(a). Owners
and operators must also begin compliance monitoring, which
requires quarterly sampling for all constituents for which the
Regional Administrator has set groundwater protection standards.
A separate provision in the compliance monitoring program also
requires the owner or operator to sample each well annually for
all constituents on the Appendix VIII list. 40 C.F.R. S264.99(f).
If the level of a constituent exceeds a ground-water protection
standard, the owner or operator must undertake corrective
action. 40 C.F.R. S264.100. Corrective action requires a
ground-water monitoring program "as effective as" the compliance
monitoring program in determining compliance with the
ground-water protection standards. 40 C.F.R. 5264.100(d).
Appendix VIII is a comprehensive list of hazardous
chemicals that EPA compiled in 1980 and used primarily as
an aid to identifying substances for listing as hazardous
-3-
wastes.1/ When EPA incorporated Appendix VIII into its ground-
water monitoring program for land-based facilities in 1982,
it acknowledged that it could not identify methods for analyzing
nine of these constituents in ground water. Subsequent attempts
to implement the regulations showed that many more constituents
were difficult or impossible to analyze. In 1984 EPA proposed
to eliminate 22 constituents from the analytical requirements.
49 Fed. Reg. 38786 (October 1, 1984).
EPA experts recently decided that further changes are
needed, and the Agency plans to issue a new proposal. In the
interim, the Office of Solid Waste plans to issue new guidance
recommending that permit writers exercise discretion in
applying Appendix VIII requirements in permit applications.
The draft guidance identifies a variety of analytical
problems. For example, some constituents may disassociate
in water without leaving any significant analyzable com-
ponents. Analysis is virtually impossible under such circum-
stances, and the draft guidance recommends that permit writers
waive data requirements for those constituents at all facilities.
For many other constituents, analysis is conceptually possible,
but very time-consuming. Analysts would have to perform
site-specific experiments adapting known test methods or
experimenting with surrogate test standards to try to produce
acceptable results. The guidance recommends that, in these
cases, permit writers should determine whether the need to
obtain data warrants a delay in issuing permits. In still other
cases, Appendix VIII listings are ambiguous or identify large
categories of chemicals. Resolving the ambiguities or analyzing
for all members of a category would also cause delays.
Consequently, the guidance recommends analyzing for specific
chemicals chosen to represent the large or ambiguous categories.
B.	 Arguments for Flexible Application of the Part
264 Regulations 
1. Facilities monitoring ground water under
the corrective action requirements 
If an owner or operator of a land-based hazardous waste
unit discovers ground-water contamination prior to permit
issuance, the permit application rules require him to submit
analyses for all Appendix VIII constituents as part of his
1/ This list has been amended several times to add consti-
tuents, particularly in conjunction with waste listing
actions.
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permit application. 40 C.F.R. 5270.14(c)(4). If the
contamination exceeds ground-water protection standards, the
permit must require the owner or operator to conduct corrective
action monitoring under 5264.100, rather than detection
monitoring under 5264.98. See 40 C.F.R. 5270.14(c) (8).
EPA currently expects that TT—will discover ground-water
contamination at a large number facilities with land-based
units prior to permit issuance. Consequently, many permitted
facilities will have to meet only the final "corrective action"
stage of the Part 264 monitoring sequence.
The corrective action monitoring regulations do not
explicitly require full Appendix VIII monitoring. Rather,
they provide that ground-water monitoring during corrective
action "may be based on the requirements for compliance
monitoring under 5264.99 and must be as effective as that
program in determining compliance with the ground-water
protection standard under 5264.92 and in determining the
success of a corretive action program under paragraph (e) of
(5264.100]." 40 C.F.R. 5264.100(d). Neither 5264.92 nor
5264.100(e) requires Appendix VIII monitoring. As noted above,
the compliance monitoring requirements in 5264.99 do require
an annual scan for all Appendix VIII constituents. See
5264.99(f). This Appendix VIII scan, however, is not directed
at measuring compliance with the ground-water protection
standards; rather, it is designed to show whether the standards
should be revised to include additional constituents. (Completely
separate requirements in 5264.99 require quarterly monitoring
of constituents included in the ground-water protection standards.)
Since the Appendix VIII scan does not serve the goal of measuring
compliance with the ground-water monitoring requirements, 5264.100
does not appear to require it.
Physical differences between compliance monitoring and
corrective action confirm what the rule appears to say. As
a practical matter, there is less need to require an Appendix
VIII scan under corrective action monitoring. Since
corrective action will remove the entire plume of contam-
ination in most cases, it is not always necessary to identify
all constituents in the plume. Consequently, we believe that
the better reading of the corrective action monitoring
requirement in 5264.100(d) is that it does not require owners
and operators to meet the compliance monitoring program's
requirement for an Appendix VIII scan. Instead, it requires
them to test only for those constituents included in their
ground-water protection standards. 2/ Thus, for the large
2/	 If a Region believes that circumstances at a specific
facility make it necessary to test for constituents
not included in the ground-water protection standard, EPA
probably has authority under new Section 3005(c)(3) of
RCRA and 40 C.F.R. 5270.32(b)(2) to require such testing as
a permit condition. These provisions are discussed in more
detail in the next section of the text.
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number of facilities that will obtain RCRA permits
requiring corrective action, Part 264 will not require full
Appendix VIII analysis.
2. Facilities monitoring ground water under detection
or compliance monitoring programs 
a. Permit conditions 
Where EPA does not discover ground-water •contamina-
tion at a land-based facility prior to permit issuance, the
permit must establish a detection monitoring program. Under
detection monitoring, the owner or operator must analyze for
all Appendix VIII constituents if he detects an increase in
any indicator parameter. 40 C.F.R. 5264.98(h)(2). During
any subsequent compliance monitoring stage, the owner or operator
must perform an annual Appendix VIII scan. 2/ These two ground-
water monitoring provisions clearly require complete Appendix
VIII analyses. However, other provisions in RCRA and EPA's
permitting regulations may authorize EPA to waive these
requirements for individual constituents if it finds that
full analysis would be either impossible or so time-consuming
that it severely conflicts with other statutory goals.
The permit regulations in Part 270 provide for two types
of permit conditions. Section 270.32(b)(2) specifies that
each permit must contain conditions necessary to ensure
compliance with the Act and applicable regulations, but gives
the permit writer freedom to incorporate regulations directly
or draft "other conditions based on" the regulations. A
newer provision more broadly authorizes permit writers to
impose conditions establishing 'terms and conditions as the
Administrator or State Director determines necessary to
protect human health and the environment." 40 C.F.R. $270.32
(b)(2). This provision is based on the new "omnibus' authority
3/	 Compliance monitoring may, in fact, be relatively rare.
Most facilities that discover increases in indicator
parameters will find contamination exceeding at least one
ground-water protection standard, and, consequently, move
directly to the corrective action phase of the monitoring
sequence. It is reasonable to assume that only a relatively
small number of facilities will find contamination that exceeds
background but does not exceed any ground-water protection
standard. Only these facilities will operate under compliance
monitoring.
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for permit conditions added to Section 3005(c)(3) of RCRA by
the 1984 amendments.4/
We believe that the Agency can argue persuasively for
waivers where analysis is impossible. Administrative law
generally recognizes exceptions to statutory requirements
where compliance is impossible. See, e.g., Alabama Power Co.
v. Costle, 636 F.2d 323 (D.C. Cir. 1979). The same principles
almost certainly apply to regulatory requirements. Since this
authority exists as a matter of general administrative law,
waiving anal y sis for "impossible" constituents is surely a
permissible use of the authority to craft permit conditions.
EPA would have authority to waive impossible regulatory
requirements without specific regulations authorizing permit
conditions that depart from the regulations. Of course, EPA
permit writers would have to ensure that they had an appropriate
factual record supporting any claim of impossibility.
The "impossibility" argument, however, does not apply
to all of the Appendix VIII constituents for which the short-term
guidance recommends flexibility. As we explained above in the
background section, for many constituents analysis is theoretically
possible, but difficult and time-consuming. Requiring an owner
or operator to analyze for many difficult constituents increases
the amount of time need to complete each analysis. At some
point, delay may begin to interfere with other statutory objectives.
The number of laboratories qualified to analyze ground water
4/ The legislative history of the new "omnibus" provision does
not explicity authorize waivers of existing regulatory
requirements. However, the legislative history at one point
suggests that EPA may use this "omnibus" authority when it has
decided that it wants to change a rule, but has not yet completed
the rulemaking process. S. Rep. No. 98-284, 98th Cong., 1st
Sess. at 31 (1983). Since regulatory changes may either
relax or tighten rules, this legislative history offers some
support for the use of omnibus conditions to waive Appendix
VIII monitoring requirements before EPA promulgates regulations
that reduce those requirements.
EPA cannot, however, easily assume that Section 3005(c) gives
it authority to waive substantive requirements. Other portions
of the legislative history suggest that Congress primarily
intended to authorize conditions that go beyond existing rules.
EPA cited some of these statements in the preamble to new
$270.32(b)(2). See 50 Fed. peg. 28722 (July 15, 1985). While
we still believe that nothing in the statute or the legislative
history expressly prohibits conditions that waive regulatory
requirements, it is important to emphasize that the use of this
authority in such a manner will require a particularly strong
factual record to show that a waiver serves the purpose of
protecting human health and the environment.
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for hazardous constituents is limited. The same labora-
tories that perform Appendix VIII analyses for Part 264 re-
quirements must also perform Appendix VIII analyses for permit
applications and more general analyses to support corrective
action for ground-water releases under Superfund and the
new RCRA cleanup authorities in Sections 3004(u) and 3008(h).
A permit writer might be able to find that insisting that a
permitted facility analyze for each constituent would consume
an unacceptable share of these finite laboratory resources,
slowing down a large number of cleanups. Delays it cleanups
could exacerbate threats to human health and the environment by
allowing more hazardous constituents to escape and migrate farther.
Under these circumstances, EPA could argue that either 5270.32
(b)(1) or 5270.32(b)(2) would authorize waivers for difficult
constituents. Factual support, including information on topics
such as laboratory capacity and the speed at which constituents
migrate, would be essential. The facts would have to show that
waivers were needed to protect health and the environment or to
ensure compliance with RCRA's permitting and corrective action
requirements.
For all waivers it would be prudent to include a "reopener"
clause in the permit that would require the owner or operator
to revisit the issue once EPA completes its revisions to the
ground-water monitoring regulations. The clause should require
the owner or operator to perform additional analyses if EPA's
final rules require testing for previously waived constituents.
To impose these requirements, EPA could argue that it had
authority to require a permit modification to respond to new
information on the analytical potential for these constituents
developed during the rulemaking. See 40 C.F.R. 5270.41(a).
b. Compliance schedules 
The permitting regulations also provide that, "where
appropriate", a permit may include a schedule leading to compliance
with regulatory requirements. 40 C.F.R. 5270.33(a). Providing
additional time through a schedule could reduce demands on
the laboratory resources needed for all types of ground-water
analyses. This could expedite the issuance of permits and
corrective action.
The compliance schedule option, however, has at least two
limitations. First, §270.33 requires continued progress
toward compliance. At a minimum, schedules must require owners
and operators to submit progress reports every year. The
preamble to the regulation emphasizes the importance of continued
progress, explaining that EPA believed interim milestones were
necessary to ensure compliance because the regulations did not
set final compliance dates. 45 Fed. Req. 33309 (May 19,
1980). Consequently, it might be difficult to defend a schedule
-8-
that required additional analysis only after EPA completed its
review of the technical problems and promulgated revisions to
the Appendix VIII monitoring requirements. Schedules which
require owners and operators to continue to try to develop
reasonably accurate methods would be easier to defend.
Moreover, schedules might not be "appropriate," within
the meaning of the regulation, where compliance is physically
impossible. The emphasis on continued progress implies that
compliance should be at least conceptually possible. Appendix
VIII constituents for which analysis is virtually impossible
might be more appropriately handled as permit conditions under
S270.32.
In conclusion, we want to emphasize again that neither
the permit condition nor the compliance schedule provisions
expressly provide for waivers or modifications to existing
regulatory requirements. Although we can argue that they
contain such authority, success will probably depend heavily on
a showing that the Agency has a compelling need to provide
relief. Under either of these provisions, EPA would need to
provide strong technical support showing that compliance is
impossible or would cause unacceptable delays.
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RCRA HAZARDOUS WASTE TANK STANDARDS BRIEFING
FOR THE
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(Above Ground)	 (Under-ground)	 (In-cound)
SECONDARY COCTX:NrIEZIT

HAZARDOUS WASTES MANAGED - 1981
Surface Impoundments 	 35.8 billion gallons











HAZARDOUS WASTE FACILITIES WITH TANKS
Storage s Treatment	 <90 Day Accumulation
(Permitted)	 Facilities	 (Generator)	 Facilities
Number of 1700 2100
Facilities












NOTES:	 • Generators using tanks to accumulate
hazardous waste for less than 90 days
are more numerous than other SIT
facilities with tanks.
• Accumulation facilities, on average, have
fewer tanks than other facilities.
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ABOVE & BELOW	 IN-GROUND	 90 my
PERCENTILE	 ABOVE GROUND	 GROUND 	 OPEN-TOP	 UNDERGROUND	 ACCUMULATION
25%	 (T-875	 1,200 gal.	 850 gal.	 (:1,675 gal	 1,300 gal.
50%	 6,000 gal.	 2,600 gal.	 2,500 gal.	 3,600 gal.	 4,000 gal.
751	 (22,000 gal.)	 20,000 gal.	 7,500 gal.	 (:8-,000	 8,000 gal.
30,000 gal.	 31, 000 gal. 60,000 9:1;;) 	 15,000 gal.
NOTES: ° Above ground tanks are the largest and have the widest
variation in size.
o Underground tanks are the smallest and have the
least variation.
o Underground and 90 day accumulation tanks are








(% of all tanks)
ABOVE fi BELOW	 IN*GROUND
ABOVE MOUND
	










Current shell thickness requirements in regulations
only work for steel tanks.
• Above and underground tanks are most often made of
steel.
• Above and below ground, and in-ground open-top tanks
are most often made of concrete.






ABOVEGROUND GROUND OPEN-TOP UNDERGROUND
25% 3 yrs. 3 yrs. 5 yrs. 4 yrs.
50% 7 yrs. 8 yrs. 12 yrs. 8 yrs.
75% 14 yrs. 17 yrs. 20 yrs. 14 yrs.
90% 25 yrs. 25 yrs. 27 yrs. 24 yrs.
NOTES: • Age distribution across different tank
types is quite similar.
• Most existing tanks in have been in service 7 or
more years.
• Many existing tanks are very old.










ABOVE & BELOW	 IN-GRCUND

















NOTES: ° Underground tanks have a high percentage of
ignitable wastes because of fire codes.
• In-grcund open-top tanks store mostly reactive
. wastes that may present air emission problems.
• Above ground tanks and above and below ground
tanks store corrosive wastes which can reduce
effective tank life.
• Amcng the tank types, underground tanks are used











TANKS: ExISTING HAZARDOUS WASTE CONTAINMENT
ABOVE GROUND














NOTES: • EPA-sponsored survey did not distinguish
between full , and partial containment.
Therefore, °caplets tank containment is
probably noC as prevalent as shown WOCAAL
• Secondary containment is used least for
under-ground tanks; most for Above grcemf
tanks.
• Secondary containment for equipment is






1. Methodology for delisting landfilled inorganic wastes:
Proposal - 50 Fed. Reg 7882 (February 26, 1985)
Final - 50 Fed. Reg 48896 (November 27, 1985)
Proposed petitions - 50 Fed. Reg. 48912, 26 (November 27, 1985), 51
Fed. Reg. 7815 (March 6, 1986)
2. Methodology for delisting landfilled organic wastes*
Proposal - 50 Fed. Reg. 48953 (November 27, 1985)
3. Methodology for delisting land treated wastes:
Proposal - 50 Fed. Reg. 48960 (November 27, 1985)
Small Generator Requirements
Proposal - 50 Fed. Reg. 31278 (August 1, 1985)
Final - 51 Fed. Reg. 10146 (March 24, 1986)
Revised Tank Standards
Proposal - 50 Fed. Reg. 26444 (June 26, 1985)
Codification of HSWA Requirements 
Final - 50 Fed. Reg. 28702 (July 15, 1985)
Proposal - 51 Fed. Reg. 10706 (March 28, 1986)
Federal facilities policy - 51 Fed. Reg. 7722, 23 (March 5, 1986)

